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Abstract
Based on an analysis of the housing market, this study measures how Japanʼ s declining
population and aging society influences its economic system in order to clarify empirically the
effects of various policies to address these issues. Specifically, we simulate the decline in
housing asset prices brought about by these population changes by 2040 and estimates the
effects of three policies designed to suppress this decline: a) accepting more immigrants, b)
raising the retirement age, and c) promoting the social advancement of women. The results
obtained show that a) staving off the decline in asset prices would be impossible unless 40
million working-age immigrants were encouraged to migrate to Japan by 2040, that b) raising
the retirement age to 70 or 75 would have a significant effect on maintaining residential price,
and that c) promoting the social advancement of women would not have a significant effect
despite incurring considerable social costs. We also extend our empirical model to a
multinational-level data and show that some of the largest economies, such as China and
Germany, would experience the aging of society in the next 30 years and those demographic
changes will negatively impact on residential prices like Japan. This indicate that the findings
of this study offer numerous suggestions not only for Japan but also for European and other
Asian countries whose societies are expected to age at a greater rate in the future.
1. Introduction
The ongoing decline in population and aging of society is the largest socio-economic issue of the
21st century for many leading nations including Japan. In particular, Japan̶which has been
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dubbed a ʻforerunner of emerging issuesʼ̶has begun to experience a faster population decline
than any other country. Combined with the fact that Japan has the worldʼs longest average
lifespan for both men and women, the aging rate of Japanese society is reaching an extremely
high level.
Researchers can examine how this population decline and changing population structure
might affect Japanʼs economy by focusing on the housing market. Because housing is the
largest asset in household finances and an essential good, observing how these population
changes are influencing the housing market allows scholars to quantify the size of their impact.
The starting point of this study is thus to clarify the effect of such changes on housing asset
prices. Specifically, the first objective is to estimate the extent of the expected decrease in
housing asset prices by municipality.
Socio-economic issues caused by this ongoing population decline and aging of society are
already occurring across Japan. In view of this, attempts are being made to develop various
policies. From an economic policy perspective, improving the productivity of society as a whole
is a pressing issue. To address this concern, specific labor market policies have been put
forward including shifting human resources from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors
and promoting the social advancement of women in order to offset the decrease in the
workforce. Accepting a certain number of immigrants has also been suggested as a policy
target. In addition, efforts are being undertaken to secure labor power by extending the
retirement age and re-employing elderly people1）. Based on these policy options, the second
objective of this study is to compare the effectiveness of these alternatives, using housing asset
prices as a benchmark.
In summary, this study clarifies the effect of the declining population and aging society in
Japan on the housing market. Furthermore, by drawing on the estimation results, it discusses
which policies would be effective in terms of suppressing the stagnation of the economic
system by means of a simulation analysis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relationship
between population and housing prices based on a survey of the research on this topic, while
Section 3 presents an empirical model to explain the relationship between population and
residential land prices, using a municipal-level panel data. Section 4 conducts a policy
simulation using the estimated results. Section 5 presents the application of the analysis for
multinational data in order to generalize the problem. In conclusion, Section 6 offers a
perspective on the discussed policy options for addressing the declining population and aging
society in Japan.
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1） For example, at the third session of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policyʼs expert panel ʻChoosing the Future,ʼ
consideration was given to employing foreign workers, and the final report indicated the importance of employing
women and the elderly (see http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-shimon/kaigi/special/future/shiryou.html). In addition,
numerical targets of raising the employment rates for women and elderly people are shown in ʻJapan Economic
Growth Strategyʼ published in June 2015 by the government (see http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/).
2. Demographics and the housing market
The ongoing decline in population and aging of society will alter housing demand and thus
housing prices considerably. Fluctuations in housing demand have temporary effects on
housing prices. For example, when housing demand grows, prices will be raised if housing
supply is inelastic; conversely, if housing demand shrinks, this will have the effect of driving
prices down. However, even if housing demand grows, prices will not rise greatly if housing
supply is elastic. If supply increases in response to the growth in housing demand, prices will
not fluctuate. In the medium to long-term, housing prices will thus converge to its fundamental
level through an adjustment of housing supply. Conversely, even if housing demand shrinks,
prices will not decrease if supply is adjusted and housing stocks decrease.
With regard to this kind of market adjustment, Kearl (1989), Poterba (1984), and
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) explained the property market equilibrium process by using
dynamic flow- or stock flow-based models. These models focus on the elasticity of supply when
the market diverges from a state of equilibrium. For housing in particular, a temporal lag exists
from the time housing construction begins until it is supplied on the market. Since market
adjustment also takes time because of transaction costs and other factors, the model explicitly
incorporates the fact that housing stocks, by their nature, are not adjusted instantaneously.
A representative study of changes in housing demand is Mankiw and Weil (1989). By
focusing on birthrate, which leads to future housing demand, and housing demand by age
group, the study projected future housing prices in the United States, predicting that over the
25-year period from the time of the estimation, US housing prices would decrease by 47% in
real terms.
Since the projected impact of Mankiw and Weilʼs (1989) finding on the housing market was
extremely large, the results subsequently led to much controversy. In 1991, for example, a
special issue of Regional Science and Urban Economics featuring critical responses to the study
was published. Setting aside the studyʼs estimations problems, the criticism focused on three
main aspects. First, it centered on the fact that changes in housing demand affect housing
rents, but have no direct effect on housing prices. Second, it suggested that because housing
supply is elastic in the long-term, as shown by the stock flow model, even a change in housing
demand would be adjusted by housing supply adjustments. Finally, it expressed concern that
since housing prices are changing at the point when fluctuation in housing demand is
predicted, (short-term) housing demand for a given year alone would not affect housing
prices2）.
In Japan, Ohtake and Shintani (1996) and Shimizu and Watanabe (2010) calculated housing
demand indicators similar to that proposed by Mankiw and Weil (1989). Their empirical results
suggested that although population factors do influence housing stocks, they do not affect
housing (residential land) prices3）. However, such estimates only focus on the short-term
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2） See Hamilton (1991) and Hendershott (1991).
3） Engelhardt and Poterbaʼs (1991) analysis using Canadian data did not obtain the same results as those presented by
Mankiw and Weil (1989).
equilibrium process; intuitively, the declining population and aging society will have a
considerable effect on long-term housing prices.
To bridge this gap in the body of knowledge, a series of studies including Nishimura (2011)
and Nishimura and Takáts (2012) have focused on the relationship between peopleʼs lifecycles
and housing demand over the long-term and analyzed the relationship between changes in
population structure and the housing market. Individuals typically build up assets during their
prime years and then use up and consume their savings (assets) upon entering their senior
years. During the asset formation period, housing assets are considered to be a safe asset for
people since they lose little value due to inflation compared with savings. Houses may
eventually be passed onto oneʼs offspring (bequest motive) or sold and the profits allocated to
expenses in oneʼ s old age. Hence, new housing demand is generated by working-age
individuals.
In an economy comprising these two generations, if life expectancy continues to increase
without the social welfare system developing to accommodate it, working-age people will act to
reduce their current consumption in preparation for post-retirement life. Therefore, the longer
life expectancy, the greater the consumption level of society as a whole will decrease. In
addition, since the elderly population depends on the working-age population in various ways,
an increase in the former would make the overall economy less active.
Based on the overlapping-generation model described above, Takáts (2012) and Saita et al.
(2015) developed empirical models of the relationship between population and the housing
market. Specifically, they considered changes in the old-age dependency ratio (i.e., changes in
the structure of the productive-age population (aged 20-64) and the elderly population (aged 65
+)) as a factor explaining housing market fluctuations. This model states that if the productive-
age population (working-age population) increases, asset demand (housing demand) will be
driven up, while if the size of the elderly population increases in relation to the productive-age
population, asset demand (housing demand) will be driven down.
3. Empirical analysis
3-1 Estimation models
This subsection presents the models used to measure the extent of the impact of demographic
changes on housing price fluctuations. These models explain the housing price change rate by
using three factors: income per capita for the population aged 20-64, the old-age dependency
ratio, and total population4）.
Model 1.
ΔlnP=α+βΔlnY+βΔlnOLDDEP+βΔlnTPOP+δ+v
i=1, ⋯, I t=1,⋯, T
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4） Sum of the effects of total population in log and the old-age dependency ratio in log, which is a log difference of the
population aged 65+ and the population aged 20-64, implicitly accounts for the effect of the population aged 0-19 that
is not considered in the theoretical model of the overlapping generation model.
P：residential land price (real value)
Y：income per capita for the population aged 20-64 (real value)
OLDDEP：old-age dependency ratio (= population aged 65+/population aged 20-64)
TPOP：total population
α, β, β, β, δ：parameters to be estimated
v：error term
The parameter estimation results provided by Model 1 will be used to measure the scope
of changes in future housing prices caused by population factors, the housing price-raising
effect of accepting immigrants, and the housing price-raising effect of raising the retirement
age. However, in the case of measuring the housing price-raising effect of increasing the
proportion of working women, the parameter estimation results provided by Model 2 will be
used.
Model 2.
ΔlnP=α+βΔlnY+βΔlnOLDDEP+βΔlnTPOP+δ+v
i=1, ⋯, I t=1,⋯, T
P：residential land price (real value)
Y：income per employed workers aged 20-64 (real value)
OLDDEP：real old-age dependency ratio (= population aged 65+/number of employed
workers aged 20-64)
TPOP：total population
α, β, β, β, δ：parameters to be estimated
v：error term
3-2 Data
By using the overlapping-generation model described in the previous section as a framework,
we prepared a municipal-level balanced panel data. Specifically, in order to estimate the models
specified in the previous section, we collected and organized the data described in Table 1. The
time-series frequency is every five years from 1980 to 2010 (seven points)5）and the cross-
section direction is 892 municipalities6）for which common data could be obtained at these
points7）.In addition, there are 1,6838）areas for which simulation analysis to 2040 is performed,
including some municipalities for which public land price surveys are not conducted.
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5） Previous studies such as Saita et al. (2013) have used data taken from “Population Census” conducted by Statistics
Bureau every five years and performed linear interpolation to obtain data for the years between the survey years.
This method increases the number of observations that can be used in parameter estimation and unit-root tests/co-
integration tests. However, for the data surveyed every five years, this does not mean that there is actually more
information in the time-series data between survey years. In addition, for the panel data used in this study, it is
theoretically possible to apply techniques such as unit-root tests and co-integration tests with respect to the dataʼs
stationarity. Nevertheless, since the data do not have much information in time-series direction and fundamentally do
not meet the requirements for those techniques in terms of the assumed number of observations, we do not report the
results of those tests. When it comes to empirical verification, we focus on the formulation of a differential regression
model using panel data.
6） Note that in areas where municipal mergers occurred, we consolidated and aggregated the data for the post-
merger area.
Table 2 summarizes the data sources used. From these data, the variables used in the
studyʼ s analysis were created. For housing asset prices, we used the public land prices
(residential land) published on January 1 of each year by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport, and Tourism. In addition, since the prices created with the method shown in Table
2 are nominal values, they were converted into real terms using the consumer price index.
In terms of income factors, we converted taxable income amounts by municipality into real
terms by using the consumer price index, in the same manner as housing prices, and obtained a
proxy for productive-age population income per capita by dividing that amount by the areaʼs
population aged 20-64. In addition, we created employed worker income per capita by using
the number of employed workers aged 20-64 as the denominator rather than the total
population aged 20-64, while taking into account the employment rate by gender for the area.
In terms of population factors, we used two variables: the old-age dependency ratio and
total population. The old-age dependency ratio, obtained by dividing an areaʼs population aged
65+ by its population aged 20-64, is an indicator that expresses how many elderly people are
supported by each productive-age person. We also used the real old-age dependency ratio as a
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7） Areas that included times when the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism did not survey
public land prices during the analysis period were excluded from the analysis. Hence, that the number of
municipalities in the cross-section direction sample is less than the number of actual municipalities.
8） The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research has not published a ʻPopulation Projection for
Japan (by Municipality)ʼ for Fukushima Prefecture; therefore, it was excluded from the simulation analysis.
Table 1: Format of the Data Used in the Analysis
Data format Regional balanced panel data
Period covered Seven periods (every five years): 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010
Area covered for the estima-
tion of the model
892 administrative areas where all data are available from 1980 to 2010
Note: Balanced panel data are produced by omitting the areas where ʻLand Market
Value Publicationʼ data are unavailable
Area covered for the simula-
tion
1,683 administrative areas where the ʻPopulation Projection for Japanʼ is available
Note: ʻPopulation Projection for Japanʼ is unavailable for administrativeareas in the
Fukushima prefecture
Table 2: Data Sources
Residential land price Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, ʻLand Market Value Publicationʼ
Note: Average land price (yen per square meter) is computed by eachadministrative area for
each year
Population (actual value) Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, ʻPopulation Censusʼ
Population (projection) National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, ʻPopulation Projection for
Japanʼ
Ratio of workers Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, ʻPopulation Censusʼ
Note: The ratio of workers is computed as the ratio of full-time workers tototal population for
each prefecture. Prefecture-level data are used as a proxy for each administrative area
located in each prefecture
Income Local Tax Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, ʻTaxable Incomeʼ
Consumer Price Index Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, ʻConsumer Price Indexʼ
Note: Prefecture-level data are used as a proxy for each administrative arealocated in each
prefecture
comparative indicator, which is obtained by using the number of employed workers aged 20-64
as the denominator instead of the population aged 20-64, while taking into account the
employment rate by gender for the area. This indicator expresses howmany elderly people are
supported by each employed worker among the productive-age population.
The changes in the average values at each data time point are shown in Figure 1, 2, and 3.
With regard to the changes in average housing prices (natural logarithmic value) over time,
Figure 1 illustrates that prices increased from 1980 to 1990, then trended downward until 2010.
It also shows that income per capita (natural logarithmic value) increased considerably until
1995 and then fell until 2010. Figure 2 shows that the old-age dependency ratio generally
trended upward, from 2000 onward in particular, since the population aged 65+ continued to
increase while the population aged 20-64 decreased. Therefore, the extent of the increase in the
old-age dependency ratio is growing larger (Figure 3).
3-3 Estimation results
Table 3 presents the estimation results for Models 1 and 2. In addition, before the estimation,
we tested the specifications for the individual and period effects in the panel estimation, and
these results are shown in Table 4. With regard to these individual and period effects, to
investigate whether fixed effect- or random effect-based estimation was supported, we tested
the null hypothesis that the individual (area/period) factor was correlated with explanatory
variables by performing a Hausman test. The results were that the null hypothesis was
rejected for both Model 1 and Model 2, and the fixed effect-based specification was supported.
Then, to examine the significance of the individual and/or period fixed effects, we
performed F-tests. The results as shown in Table 4 supported an estimation based on period
fixed effects only, without including individual fixed effects. Drawing on those results, we
estimated models that take into account period fixed effects only for both Model 1 and Model 2.
Overall, when income per capita increases by 1%, housing prices increase by 1.23% (or 1.
21% in Model 2). Similarly, if the old-age dependency ratio increases by 1%9），housing prices
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9） This is the ratio data log difference, not the ratio variation width (% pts).
Table 3: Model Estimation Results
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Δln Yit 1.230 0.045 *** 1.212 0.047 ***
Δln OLDDEPit -0.617 0.046 *** -0.684 0.044 ***
Δln TPOPit 0.409 0.053 *** 0.374 0.053 ***
Intercept 0.392 0.011 *** 0.402 0.010 ***
Individual Effect None None
Period Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect
Number of observations 5,352 5,352
Adjusted R-squared 0.643 0.641
Note: Signs *** represent the estimated parameters are significant at 1%.
decrease by 0.62% (or 0.68% in Model 2), while if total population increases by 1%, housing
prices increase by 0.41% (or 0.37% in Model 2). These results are consistent with the analytical
findings of Takáts (2012) and Saita et al. (2015).
3-4 Economic and demographic impacts
Here, based on the estimated models, we decompose the housing price change rate for each
period into economic and demographic impacts. Economic impacts are calculated as the
contribution rate based on the change in income per capita in relation to the land price increase
rate by municipality, while demographic impacts are calculated as the contribution rate based
on changes in total population and old age dependency ratio.
Table 5 presents the summary statistics and Table 6 presents the correlations. Since the
pattern of land price changes differs in urban and regional areas, we compared changes at the
national level with changes in the Tokyo metropolitan area, which has the highest urban
density in Japan. Figure 4 illustrates the decomposition results in average.
In the early 1980s, most new housing demand since World War II occurred as Baby
Boomers entered the housing market, leading to a 10% annual average increase in Japanʼs
residential land prices. However, in the late 1980s, an urban property boom known as the
greatest bubble of the 20th century occurred, and the rate of land price increase dropped to
around 6% nationally. In the Tokyo metropolitan area, the average increase was in line with the
national average (9.8%) in 1980-1985; however, land prices rose significantly in 1985-1990 by an
average of 15% per year. These land price increases were caused by economic rather than
demographic impacts.
Next, during the 10-year period from 1990 to 2000 after the bubble collapsed, national land
prices continued to decrease by over 2% per year, with annual declines of an average of 5% to
6% in the Tokyo metropolitan area. This decline in land prices was caused by demographic
rather than economic impacts. This trend continued from 2000, with the aging of the population
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Table 4: Specification Test Results
Individual
effect
Period
effect
Model 1 Model 2
Test-stat. P-value Test-stat. P-value
Hausman test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
441.039 0.000 429.038 0.000
Formula 2 Random Random
F test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
4.186 0.000 4.226 0.000
Formula 2 None None
F test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
0.644 1.000 0.657 1.000
Formula 2 None Fixed
F test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
556.495 0.000 545.161 0.000
Formula 2 Fixed None
F test
Formula 1 None Fixed
675.630 0.000 679.189 0.000
Formula 2 None None
F test
Formula 1 Fixed None
0.670 1.000 0.739 1.000
Formula 2 None None
in particular pushing land prices downward.
Figures 5 6, 7 and 8 present the correlations of land price increases with economic and
demographic impacts and of economic impacts with demographic impacts for Japan and for the
Tokyo metropolitan area, respectively. With the exception of certain periods, the relationship
between land price fluctuations and economic factors is positive. On the contrary, it is not
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Table 5: Land Price Increase Rates, Economic Impacts, and Demographic Impacts by Municipality
1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010
Change in
land price
(per annum)
National overall
Mean 9.9% 6.3% -2.0% -2.5% -4.3% -2.4%
Std. Dev. 4.5% 7.6% 5.5% 2.7% 2.7% 2.1%
Max. 34.3% 38.9% 16.0% 4.8% 3.3% 8.2%
Min. -6.1% -9.2% -25.8% -18.6% -14.0% -11.1%
Tokyo and
surroundings
Mean 9.8% 15.0% -6.2% -5.7% -5.0% -0.4%
Std. Dev. 3.3% 5.7% 4.7% 2.2% 3.0% 1.7%
Max. 21.1% 38.9% 3.2% -1.8% 2.4% 7.4%
Min. 2.1% 2.6% -25.8% -14.2% -14.0% -3.5%
Economic
impact
(per annum)
National overall
Mean 2.8% 5.6% 2.9% -0.5% -0.7% 0.1%
Std. Dev. 1.3% 1.7% 2.6% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0%
Max. 10.2% 17.8% 17.0% 5.0% 5.9% 7.0%
Min. -4.1% -0.9% -6.7% -10.1% -4.4% -2.9%
Tokyo and
surroundings
Mean 2.8% 6.8% 0.5% -1.3% 0.3% 0.4%
Std. Dev. 1.3% 2.1% 1.6% 0.8% 1.1% 1.0%
Max. 10.2% 17.8% 3.9% 1.4% 5.9% 5.0%
Min. -0.1% 3.8% -6.7% -4.5% -1.4% -2.6%
Demographic
impact
(per annum)
National overall
Mean -1.2% -1.7% -2.0% -2.2% -2.2% -2.2%
Std. Dev. 1.0% 1.2% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0%
Max. 4.7% 5.4% 4.5% 0.4% 1.9% 3.2%
Min. -4.9% -9.0% -6.4% -5.4% -5.3% -5.9%
Tokyo and
surroundings
Mean -1.0% -1.0% -1.8% -2.6% -2.7% -2.6%
Std. Dev. 1.0% 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% 1.2% 1.4%
Max. 4.7% 5.3% 2.4% 0.1% 1.9% 2.7%
Min. -2.7% -4.2% -4.4% -5.4% -5.3% -5.2%
Table 6: Correlation of Land Price Change Rates, Economic Impacts, and Demographic Impacts
1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010
Change in land
price vs.
Economic impact
National overall 0.100 0.526 0.382 0.362 0.043 0.277
Tokyo and
surroundings
0.209 0.658 0.703 0.353 0.671 0.345
Change in land
price vs.
Demographic impact
National overall 0.123 0.411 0.186 0.153 0.279 -0.049
Tokyo and
surroundings
0.170 -0.268 0.455 -0.146 0.311 0.664
Economic
impact vs.
Demographic impact
National overall 0.359 0.297 -0.254 0.022 -0.054 -0.273
Tokyo and
surroundings
0.547 -0.229 0.388 0.098 0.406 -0.039
possible to identify such a simple structure for the relationship between land price increases
and demographic factors and between economic factors and demographic factors. Since we
created a composite indicator for demographic factors (total population change rate and the
old-age dependency ratio), the underlying structure is complexly intertwined. This fact
suggests that after simulating the effect of demographic impact changes on land prices,
separating changes in total population from those in the old-age dependency ratio is necessary.
4. Simulation analysis
4-1 Simulation analysis of residential land prices based on changes in demographic factors
When land price change rates were divided into economic and demographic factors, we found
that decreases in land prices were caused by demographic impacts. Therefore, using the model
estimation results described above and future population estimates, we now present the results
of a simulation analysis that examines how much residential land prices will change in the
future based on demographic factors10）11）12）.
The predictions for 2020, 2030, and 2040 for the demographic factors used in the future
residential land price simulation are summarized in Table 7 and Figure 9. For Japan as a whole,
total population will decrease by around 15% from approximately 126 million in 2010 to 107
million in 2040. By age, the population aged 20-64 will decrease by about 27% by 2040, while the
population aged 65+will increase by about 33%. The old-age dependency ratio was 0.39 in 2010,
but it is predicted to rise to 0.72 in 2040.
With regard to the residential land price simulation based on these predicted values for
demographic factors, Figure 10a13）summarizes the cumulative distribution of residential land
prices by region at 10-year intervals from 2020 to 2040. The results show that if we take the
price in 2010 as 1, residential land prices in about half of all regions will decrease to around 0.8
or less in 2020, to around 0.7 or less in 2030, and to around 0.6 or less in 2040.
Drawing on these predicted residential land prices based on demographic factors, we next
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10） The parameters estimated in the previous section expressed changes in average housing prices from 1980 to 2010
based on changes in the three variables included in the models. Changes in housing prices at times that exceeded or
fell below the average level of change for that period (e.g., fluctuations due to the formation and collapse of the bubble)
were interpreted as being absorbed by period fixed effects. Since we estimated the average effect over the past 30
years, it should also be noted with regard to recent developments, such as the level of housing demand incidence
accompanying the trend toward nuclear families and changes in housing demand accompanying the aging of society,
that we are using average trends over the 30 years of the data distribution period rather than the conditions at the
simulation start point. Furthermore, the simulation analysis uses only demographic factors (the old-age dependency
ratio and total population). Therefore, the housing price simulation results assume that there are no changes in
economic factors such as income, which is included in the models, or interest rates, which are not. In addition, with
regard to population movement between regions in Japan, we relied on the net migration rates employed in the
calculations for the National Institute of Population and Social Security Researchʼs (IPSS) ʻPopulation Projections for
Japan by Region.ʼ It should be noted that greater population movement between regions may be anticipated
depending on changes in residential land prices, differences in economic growth by region, and so on, but the
simulation results do not take these effects into account.
11） Note that the estimation model is in log-difference. Thus the change in the total population and the old age
dependency ratio, not the levels in those variables, do affect the simulation results. In addition, for example in the old
age dependency ratio, a 0.1pt change at a lower level (say a change from 0.1 to 0.2) is treated to be larger than a 0.1pt
change at a higher level (say a change from 0.8 to 0.9) when taking a log-difference.
simulate the impact of the three policy measures and present the findings in the remainder of
this section. First, to examine the extent to which housing demand would be created by
accepting immigrants and to what degree this would offset the decrease in residential land
prices, we will estimate the number of immigrants (foreign workers) that would be needed to
maintain the 2010 land price level. Second, we will estimate the extent to which housing
demand would be created and residential land price decreases offset if the retirement age were
raised from 65 to 70 or 75 in order to utilize the labor power of the older generation. Third, we
will estimate the extent to which housing demand would be created and residential land price
decreases offset if the female employment rate were raised to the same level as the male
employment rate in order to utilize the labor power of women.
4-2 Estimation of the residential land price-raising effect of accepting immigrants
The first simulation looks at addressing the issue through immigration policy. Here, we
assumed a scenario where foreigners aged 20-34 are accepted in 2010 and live in Japan until
2040 or a scenario where foreigners are accepted aged 35-64 in 2010 and move abroad before
2040 at the point when they reach age 65, while, at the same time, an equivalent number of
immigrants aged 20-64 are accepted. In addition, we assumed that the children of accepted
immigrants have an effect equivalent to one additionally accepted immigrant upon reaching
age 20.
Furthermore, with regard to this intake of immigrants, we posited that the employment
rate (proportion of the accepted immigrants who are workers), housing demand volume by life
stage, labor productivity, and other parameters are at the same level as for residents in Japan
before the intake of immigrants.
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12） Note the population migration across the regions could also be induced by the residential land price change, which
causes a possible endogeneity problem in our estimation model. A solution to this endogeneity problem in the
estimation is suggested by Saita, et. al. (2015); using a without-migration-population data as an instrumental variable
(IV) to correct for the OLS estimation results. However, as noted in the footnote 10, population projection data used in
our simulation analysis is provided by the IPSS, in which the effect of residential price change on the population
migration across regions is NOT taken into consideration. Thus, in order to “forecast residential land price”, rather
than “simulate the demographic impacts on residential land price”, it would be important to model empirically the
feedback system between the residential land price change and the population migration.
In this aspect, our simulation results are thought to be more convincing andplausible at a viewpoint of semi-
macro/macro level than a viewpoint of microlevel.
13） The simulation analysis covers the 1,683 regions obtained from the estimated data on future population, not the 892
regions used in the model estimation. For details, see Table 1.
Table 7: Changes over Time in Estimated Future Population/Old-Age Dependency Ratio
National
Total
Total Population
Working-age Population
(Age 20 to 64)
Old-age Population
(Age 65 and over)
Old-age
Dependency
Ratio (%)(persons) (2010=100) (persons) (2010=100) (persons) (2010=100)
2010 126,094,834 100 74,337,032 100 29,058,557 100 39%
2020 124,099,926 98 67,830,462 91 36,123,804 124 53%
2030 116,617,659 92 62,784,394 84 36,849,259 127 59%
2040 107,275,851 85 53,932,635 73 38,678,102 133 72%
Based on this assumption, we simulated the number of accepted immigrants that would be
required in order to maintain the 2010 residential land price level in each region, using
numerical calculations based on the Model 1 parameter estimation results and future
population estimates. Table 8 summarizes the results for Japan as a whole at 2020, 2030, and
2040, while Figure 10b illustrates the cumulative distribution by region for the proportion of
the total population represented by the immigrant intake.
The results for Japan as a whole show that in order to support 2010 residential land price
levels, it would be necessary to accept around 40 million immigrants by 2040, or around 1.3
million per year. The proportion of the total population represented by immigrants would thus
be 27% by 2040, meaning that about one out of four people would be additional immigrants.
Moreover, within the simulation framework, we expressed the number of immigrants that
would need to be accepted to increase the proportion of the production-age population relative
to the total number in Japan. In other viewpoint, this result could be interpreted as how much
movement of the productive-age population from outside the region is required to maintain
residential land prices at the 2010 level if additional population movement occurs between
regions without increasing the proportion of the production-age population in Japan as whole?
However, if residential land prices are maintained at the 2010 level in a given region, prices will
decrease even further in other regions due to population outflow. Therefore, it should be noted
that there will be a relative increase in living costs for those people who relocate to the region
where residential land prices are maintained at the 2010 level.
4-3 Estimation of the residential land price-raising effect of increasing retirement age
The second simulation looks at the effect of addressing the issue by employing the labor power
of the older generation. Here, we focus on the extent to which residential land prices could be
increased by raising the retirement age from 65 to either 70 or 75, thereby increasing peopleʼs
lifetime income, home-buying budget (accumulation of savings for living expenses aftire
retirements), and housing demand. Moreover, since the level of dependence on the social
welfare system of the population aged 65-69 or 65-74 would also be reduced, this policy has the
indirect effect of increasing housing demand by enhancing the disposable income of the
population aged 20-64, which bears the burden of funding social welfare expenses.
For this simulation, we assumed that when the population aged 65-69 or 65-74 is added to
the labor force, it has the same labor productivity as the population aged 20-64. In addition, we
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Table 8: Simulation Results for Accepting Immigrants
National
Total
Total Population
(Without immigration)
Total Population
(With immigration)
Number of
immigrants
(cumulative) (persons)
As a share of
total population
(%)(persons) (2010=100) (persons) (2010=100)
2010 126,094,834 100 126,094,834 100 - -
2020 124,099,926 98 143,390,133 114 19,290,207 13%
2030 116,617,659 92 143,524,718 114 26,907,059 19%
2040 107,275,851 85 147,080,521 117 39,804,670 27%
assumed that the effect of increased housing demand is unchanged, that the employment rate
from age 65-69 or 65-74 is at the same level as that for ages 20-64, and that all increased
lifetime income will be spent by that generationʼs population during their lifetime, with no
increase in the inheritance passed onto their childrenʼs generation.
Based on these assumptions, we adjusted both the old-age dependency ratioʼs numerator
and denominator for 2020, 2030, and 2040 assuming that retirement age would be raised and
estimated the residential land price-raising effect by region, using the Model 1 parameter
estimation results and future population estimates. The results are as shown in Figure 11a and
b.
By looking at the results for 2040 and taking residential land prices in 2010 as 1, we observe
that residential land prices would drop to around 0. 78 in about half of all regions if the
retirement age were raised to 70 compared with around 0. 62 if this policy were not
implemented. This finding means that a price-raising effect is approximately 16 percentage
points at a median value in the 1,683 regions. Similarly, if the retirement age were raised to 75,
residential land prices would drop to around 0.98 in about half of all regions, a median price-
raising effect of approximately 36 percentage points compared with the value if this policy
were not implemented.
4-4 Estimation of the residential land price-raising effect of increasing the female employment rate
The third simulation looks at the effect of addressing the issue by employing the labor power of
women. Here, with regard to the difference between male and female employment rates shown
in Figure 12, we focused on the extent to which residential land prices would be raised because
of growing housing demand if the female employment rate were increased to the same level as
the male employment rate in 2010 and both levels were then maintained until 2040.
Since the employment rate here indicates the proportion of working full-time, as shown in
Table 2, the assumption is that women will make social advancement and reach employment
conditions equivalent to men. It should be noted that any resulting changes, such as changes in
the average income level of men because of a reduction in working hours resulting from
increased involvement in housework or changes in birthrate due to increased involvement in
work, higher household incomes, and so forth (change in population aged 20+) in the future
have not been taken into account.
Based on these assumptions, we adjusted the real old-age dependency ratioʼs denominator
for 2020, 2030, and 2040 and estimated the residential land price-raising effect by region using
the Model 2 parameter estimation results, future population estimates, and the employment
rate set as described above14）. The results are as shown in Figure 13a.
By looking at the results for 2040 and taking residential land prices in 2010 as 1, we observe
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14） To compare the effects of the different policies, we performed the simulation based on the following method. First,
by using the Model 2 parameter estimation values, we simulated both residential land prices if the female employment
rate were raised and residential land prices if the female employment rate were not raised at future points in time, and
then calculated the ratio of these (the offsetting effect of raising the female employment rate on residential land
prices). We next estimated residential land prices at future points in time by multiplying this ratio by future
residential land price projections using the Model 1 parameter estimates.
that residential land prices would drop to around 0.72 in about half of all regions if the female
employment rate were raised compared with around 0. 62 or less if this policy were not
implemented. This finding means that a price-raising effect is approximately 10 percentage
points at a median value in the 1,683 regions.
4-5 Comparison of policy effects
Finally, Figure 13b compares the effects of the different policies. As this figure shows, while the
social advancement of women has a certain effect, it is less than the effect of raising the
retirement age to 70. Figure 13 also clarifies that the effect of raising the retirement age to 75
has a marked effect, while in order for no drop in residential land prices to occur, it would be
necessary to accept as many as 1.3 million immigrants per year.
Changes in population structure in response to policies a) accepting more immigrants, b)
raising the retirement age to 70/75 and c) promoting the social advancement of women are
presented in Figure 14 and 15.
5. Application for multinational analysis
In order to examine the robustness of the analysis for Japan, we extend our empirical model to
a multinational-level panel data. Our multinational panel data covers 21 developed/developing
countries between 1981 and 2013 in annual frequency (N = 21, T = 33, N×T = 693). The
countries covered are; 3 Asian countries (Japan, Korea and Hong Kong), 2 Oceania countries
(Australia and New Zealand), 2 North American countries (United States and Canada), 1 Africa
country (South Africa), and 13 European countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway,
Sweden, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands and
Switzerland).
5-1 Data and stationarity test
Nominal residential price index is gathered from “Residential Property Price Statistics”
conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)15）. Nominal residential price is
deflated by CPI. For Real GDP, CPI and Population by age groups we gathered from the World
Bank database (data.worldbank.org).
Changes in average values are shown in Figure 16, 17 and 18. Variables shown in Figure
16 and 17 are indexed as 2010 = 100 and variables shown in Figure 18 express the ratios. For
each variable, left side shows the level and right side shows the first difference. Most of the
variables have upward/downward trends in the level, thus in prior to model estimation, we
conducted stationarity tests for the variables. The variables tested are; real residential price,
real GDP per working-age population aged 15 to 64, the old age dependency ratio (a ratio of
population aged 65 and over to population aged 15 to 64) 16）, and the total population.
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15） Quarterly series are annualized by taking arithmetic average of 4-quarters in each year.
16） Here we re-defined the working-age population as the population aged 15 to 64, not 20 to 64. The reason for this is
that in the most of the countries the employment rates for ages 15 to 19 are not as low as Japanʼs, which is 6.1% in 2010.
Results of panel unit root test are presented in Table 917）. The results suggest that all the
variables are in non-stationary process in the level and taking the first difference is required in
the model estimation in order to avoid a spurious regression.
5-2 Empirical model and estimation results
Using the data described above, we run a panel regression model described in Model 3.
Model 3.
ΔlnP=α+βΔlnY+βΔlnOLDDEP+βΔlnTPOP+φ+δ+v
i=1, ⋯, I t=1,⋯, T
P：residential price (real value)
Y：income per capita for the population aged 15-64 (real value)
OLDDEP：old-age dependency ratio (= population aged 65+/population aged 15-64)
TPOP：total population
α, β, β, β, φ, δ：parameters to be estimated
v：error term
Before estimating the model we conducted a co-integration relationship test and
specification test in a panel regression.
Firstly, in order to check whether variables in the model are in a co-integration
relationship, we conducted panel co-integration tests (Kao test and Pedroni test). The test
results presented in Table 10 suggest that a null hypothesis of no co-integration relationship
(non-stationary process in the estimated residuals obtained from co-integration vector
estimation) is not rejected at a significance level of 1% in the most types of the test18）. Given this
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17） We conducted three types of tests, a common unit root test based on Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), individual unit root
tests based on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Maddala andWu (1999). The individual unit root test would fit better in
our study because our panel data consists of 21 countries which have different economic and demographic
development history over the past 30 years.
Table 9: Panel Unit Root Test Results for Multinational Datasets
Common Unit Root Test Individual Unit Root Test
Levin, Lin and Chu Im, Pesaran and Shin Maddala and Wu
Level
log(Real Residential Price) -3.31 (0.00) *** 0.10 (0.54) 47.64 (0.25)
log(Real GDP per working age
population)
-6.47 (0.00) *** -0.00 (0.50) 42.01 (0.47)
log(Old age dependency ratio) 0.08 (0.53) 4.54 (1.00) 39.93 (0.56)
log(Total Population) -0.66 (0.25) 7.48 (1.00) 28.20 (0.95)
1st
difference
Δlog(Real Residential Price) -5.80 (0.00) *** -8.23 (0.00) *** 147.32 (0.00) ***
Δlog(Real GDP per working age
population)
-13.37 (0.00) *** -12.14 (0.00) *** 219.75 (0.00) ***
Δlog(Old age dependency ratio) 0.39 (0.65) -2.81 (0.00) *** 85.21 (0.00) ***
Δlog(Total Population) -1.97 (0.02) ** -2.72 (0.00) *** 81.59 (0.00) ***
Note: Each column reports test statisitcs with p-values in parenthesis. Signs *** and ** represent the null hypothesis is rejected at
significace level of 1% and 5% respectively. Selection of lag lengths in ADF test is based on SIC criteria.
results, we go through by running a panel regression in the first difference, rather than
running an error correction model.
Secondly, in order to check the specification of fixed/random/no effect for individual and
period effects in a panel regression, we conducted Hausman test and F test. The test results
presented in Table 11 support a specification with fixed effect for both individual and period
effects.
Estimation result of Model 3 is presented in Table 12. Signs of estimated parameters are
consistent with those of Model 1 and 2, panel regression results with municipality-level data in
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18） Again, in our case Pedroni (1999) test would fit better than Kao (1999) test, which puts a strong assumptions of
homogeneity across regions, because our panel data consists of 21 countries which have different fluctuations in
residential price, economic and demographic variables over the past 30 years.
Table 10: Panel Co-integration Test Results for Multinational Datasets
Test type
Assumption on
homogeneity of
co-integration
vector across regions
Assumption on
homogeneity of
auto-correlation
coefficient across regions
Test
statistics
type
Test results
Kao test Homogeneous Homogeneous ADF -3.44 (0.00) ***
Pedroni
test
Heterogeneous
Homogeneous
Panel v 0.42 (0.34)
Panel rho 1.87 (0.97)
Panel PP 1.25 (0.89)
Panel ADF -0.56 (0.29)
Heterogeneous
Group rho 3.39 (1.00)
Group PP 1.83 (0.97)
Group ADF -1.68 (0.05) **
Note: Each column reports test statisitcs with p-values in parenthesis. Signs ***, **, and * represent the null
hypothesis is rejected at significace level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Selection of lag lengths in ADF test is based
on SIC criteria.
Table 11: Specification Test Results for Multinational Datasets
Individual
Effect
Period
Effect
Model 3
Test-stat. P-value
Hausman test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
22.211 0.000
Formula 2 Random Random
F test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
4.092 0.000
Formula 2 None None
F test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
2.588 0.000
Formula 2 None Fixed
F test
Formula 1 Fixed Fixed
4.903 0.000
Formula 2 Fixed None
F test
Formula 1 None Fixed
4.821 0.000
Formula 2 None None
F test
Formula 1 Fixed None
2.388 0.001
Formula 2 None None
Japan between 1980 and 2010.
5-3 Decomposition of historic residential price change into economic and demographic impacts
Using parameter estimation results of Model 3 (β

=+1.792, β

=−0.724, β

=+1.846) and
historic change in each variable (Y , OLDDEP, TPOP), we decompose the historic residential
price change into economic impacts (=exp β

ΔlnY−1), demographic impacts
(=exp β

ΔlnOLDDEP+β

ΔlnTPOP−1), and residuals.
The decomposition results of historic price change in average of between 1981 and 2013
are presented in Figure 19, and the results by temporal block are presented in Figure 20 to 22.
It is shown that historic economic impacts are estimated to be positive for most of the 21
countries, except for South Africa. However, historic demographic impact of South Africa is
estimated to be the largest out of 21 countries. For the other countries, the estimated
demographic impacts are positive in the most of the countries except for Japan.
Correlations among historic price change, economic impact and demographic impact are
presented in Figure 23 and Table 13. Economic impact has a correlation with residential price
change at a certain level over the study period, while demographic impact does not seem to
have a correlation with residential price change clearly.
5-4 Simulation analysis of demographic impacts
Using parameter estimation results of Model 3 (β

=−0.724, β

=+1.846) and population
projection (OLDDEP, TPOP) obtained from United Nations, ʻWorld Population Prospectsʼ
(Medium Fertility Estimates), we conduct a simulation analysis of estimating total demographic
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Table 12: Estimation Results of Panel Regression with Multinational Datasets
Model 3
Estimate Std. Error
Δln Yit 1.792 0.131 ***
Δln OLDDEPit -0.724 0.239 **
Δln TPOPit 1.846 0.581 **
Intercept -0.063 0.018 ***
Individual Effect Fixed Effect
Period Effect Fixed Effect
Number of observations 672
Adjusted R-squared 0.391
Note: Signs *** and ** represent the estimated parameters are
significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Table 13: Correlation of Historic Residential Price Change, Economic Impact and Demographic Impact
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2013 1981-2013
Change in residential price vs Economic impact 0.424 0.528 0.461 0.444
Change in residential price vs Demographic impact -0.149 0.018 0.297 0.065
Economic impact vs Demographic impact -0.208 -0.206 -0.031 -0.140
impacts on residential price in each country in the next 30 years.
Again, note this simulation framework do not take into account other effects than the old-
age dependency ratio and the total population, such as individual fixed effect (φ

). In addition, it
is assumed that the parameters on these variables hold constant in the next 30 years, and that
changes in relative cost of living caused by residential price fluctuation in each country do not
alter the population projection in/out-flow19）.
In addition to 21 countries used in the model estimation, we conducted the simulation
analysis by extrapolation for other 35 countries where long series of residential price index was
not available in the estimation; 12 Asian countries (China, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Cyprus), 5 South and
Central American countries (Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Argentina), and 18 European
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Estonia, Iceland,
Latvia, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, Austria, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Malta
and Romania).
Simulation results of total demographic impacts on residential price index are presented in
Table 14 and Figure 24 to 29 together with the projection of the total population and the old age
dependency ratio.
The simulated total demographic impact on residential price from 2010 to 2040 is about
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19） An endogeneity problem in the regression model would become less serious in the multinational simulation
analysis than the case of Japan because differences in the cost of living resulting from residential prices do not seem to
be a major factor in the population in/out-flow across countries.
Table 14: Projection of Total Population and Old age dependency ratio,
and Simulation Results of Residential Price Index
Total Population
(2010=100)
Old age dependency ratio
Residential Price Index
(2010=100)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2010 2020 2030 2040 2010 2020 2030 2040
Asia
Japan 100 98 95 90 36% 49% 54% 65% 100 78 68 54
China 100 105 107 106 11% 17% 24% 35% 100 83 66 49
Korea 100 105 108 108 15% 22% 37% 54% 100 84 60 46
Hong Kong 100 107 112 114 17% 26% 44% 57% 100 84 63 53
Malaysia 100 116 130 141 7% 10% 14% 18% 100 105 99 95
Myanmar 100 108 113 114 7% 9% 13% 17% 100 98 84 69
Philippines 100 118 137 154 6% 8% 10% 12% 100 115 126 138
Singapore 100 119 130 136 12% 19% 32% 41% 100 99 81 73
Thailand 100 102 102 99 12% 18% 29% 42% 100 79 55 40
India 100 112 122 130 8% 9% 12% 15% 100 108 107 102
Indonesia 100 112 122 129 8% 9% 13% 19% 100 107 96 84
Israel 100 115 130 145 17% 20% 23% 26% 100 112 128 144
Saudi Arabia 100 119 131 140 4% 6% 10% 17% 100 114 93 72
Turkey 100 111 120 127 11% 13% 18% 25% 100 104 95 83
Cyprus 100 110 118 122 16% 21% 27% 32% 100 102 96 89
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Oceania
Australia 100 114 126 139 20% 26% 31% 34% 100 106 112 123
New Zealand 100 110 119 126 20% 25% 33% 37% 100 99 95 97
Northern
America
United States 100 108 116 123 19% 26% 33% 35% 100 95 90 95
Canada 100 110 119 126 20% 28% 37% 40% 100 96 89 94
South and
Central
America
Mexico 100 112 122 129 9% 12% 17% 25% 100 102 94 79
Chile 100 109 116 120 13% 18% 27% 35% 100 94 78 69
Brazil 100 108 114 118 10% 14% 20% 27% 100 93 78 67
Colombia 100 113 123 131 9% 12% 17% 23% 100 97 88 81
Argentina 100 109 116 122 16% 19% 21% 24% 100 107 110 108
Africa South Africa 100 107 113 118 8% 10% 11% 12% 100 99 97 100
Europe
Czech Republic 100 104 105 105 22% 30% 33% 38% 100 84 80 73
Hungary 100 98 95 92 24% 30% 32% 36% 100 83 75 65
Poland 100 100 98 94 19% 27% 35% 39% 100 76 62 53
Russian Federation 100 97 93 88 18% 22% 28% 28% 100 84 65 59
Slovakia 100 101 99 96 17% 24% 31% 36% 100 79 64 54
Denmark 100 104 108 112 25% 31% 37% 40% 100 92 89 88
Estonia 100 97 93 90 26% 30% 34% 38% 100 85 73 62
Finland 100 103 105 106 26% 37% 43% 43% 100 82 76 76
Iceland 100 111 121 127 18% 23% 31% 35% 100 102 97 96
Ireland 100 111 120 127 17% 22% 27% 34% 100 101 98 94
Latvia 100 94 89 84 27% 29% 33% 35% 100 85 70 60
Norway 100 111 119 127 23% 27% 32% 37% 100 105 107 109
Sweden 100 107 114 120 28% 34% 37% 39% 100 99 104 110
United Kingdom 100 106 111 114 25% 30% 36% 40% 100 98 94 91
Greece 100 100 99 98 29% 34% 40% 51% 100 88 76 63
Italy 100 101 101 101 31% 36% 45% 58% 100 92 78 64
Portugal 100 100 99 96 27% 32% 40% 52% 100 88 73 58
Slovenia 100 102 102 100 24% 32% 40% 47% 100 85 71 62
Spain 100 103 104 105 25% 30% 38% 53% 100 94 80 64
Austria 100 104 107 110 26% 30% 39% 47% 100 98 85 78
Belgium 100 104 107 109 26% 32% 39% 44% 100 93 83 79
France 100 105 110 113 26% 33% 39% 44% 100 92 88 85
Germany 100 99 96 92 32% 36% 48% 57% 100 89 68 56
Luxembourg 100 114 125 134 20% 23% 28% 35% 100 118 119 118
Netherlands 100 103 104 104 23% 31% 41% 49% 100 84 70 62
Switzerland 100 110 121 131 25% 29% 35% 39% 100 108 111 118
Bulgaria 100 92 84 76 27% 33% 36% 42% 100 75 58 43
Croatia 100 96 93 88 26% 32% 40% 45% 100 80 64 54
Lithuania 100 96 92 87 22% 24% 30% 34% 100 87 68 57
Malta 100 103 103 101 21% 31% 41% 43% 100 78 64 60
Romania 100 97 93 87 21% 25% 29% 38% 100 84 70 51
Note: Country classification is based on United Nations, ʻWorld Population Prospectsʼ. Country names with underline indicate
the 21 countries included in the model estimation.
-46% in Japan. This result is deemed to be approximately consistent with the simulation
analysis presented in the previous sections, although the definition of ʻworking-age populationʼ
and the population projection data differ between them20）. This would indicate that our study
for Japan in previous sections has robustness and a similar discussion could be applied to other
countries.
Population decline in the next 30 years is not expected to be present in the most of Asian,
Oceania and American countries except for Japan, and some of the European countries might
experience more than 10% decline. However, in the most of the countries, aging is expected to
grow faster than the past in the next 30 years.
Some countries in Asia, such as Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand, the old-age
dependency ratio are expected to rise from about 10-20% to 40-60% in the next 30 years. Aging
is also expected to grow in China (from 11% to 35%). Total demographic impacts on residential
price in those countries are estimated to be about -50 to -60% (about -30% in Singapore where
total population is expected to grow +36% in 2040).
The old-age dependency ratio is also expected to rise from about 20% to 40% in Oceania
and North American countries. However total demographic impacts on residential price are
not as serious in those countries since the total population is expected to grow about +20% to +
30%. The estimated impact is positive in Australia where the total population is expected to
grow about +40%.
Looking at European countries, the old-age dependency ratio is expected to rise from
about 20-30% to 30-50%, resulting in the total demographic impacts on residential price to be
less than -20% in 22 countries out of 31. Germany, the greatest country in its GDP in EU, is
going to experience a population decline of about 8% and the old-age dependency ratio to rise
from 32% to 57% in the next 30 years, following a similar path to that of Japan in the next 30
years.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we analyzed the housing market and measured how Japanʼs declining population
and aging society is influencing its economic system. We also estimated the effects of three
policies designed to suppress this decline: a) accepting more immigrants, b) raising the
retirement age, and c) promoting the social advancement of women.
The results showed that a) around 40 million immigrants would be needed by 2040 to
maintain housing asset values as of 2010. In other words, the ratio of foreigners in the total
Japanese population would need to increase to approximately 30%. At the present time, it is
extremely difficult to imagine Japan accepting this kind of society.
Meanwhile, c) to promote the social advancement of women, even assuming a fixed
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20） The total demographic impact on residential price from 2010 to 2040 is estimated to be about -36% at a national
average in the case of municipal-level simulation analysis for Japan. There is actually a 10%pt difference between the
two simulated results, which is caused by differences in the parameters and the projection data, thus attentions need
to be paid at a certain range around the simulated values.
birthrate, it would be necessary to provide more childcare alternatives for families in order to
maintain the housing asset value to a little extent. If the aim of society were to increase the
birthrate, then greater infrastructural development such as new daycares would be required,
which would incur significant costs.
The foregoing arguments suggest that the most effective and least costly policy would be
b) extending the retirement age, especially given that life expectancy is expected to lengthen
due to advances in medical technology. In reality, this solution could only be achieved by
shaping the future by implementing multiple related policies. Moreover, it is necessary to
recognize that the effects of such a policy would have only a temporary impact, as the baby
boomers in Japan (born in 1947-1949) are entering their retirement age of 65 in 2015 and raising
the retirement age has the effect of delaying this phenomenon for 5-10 years. Indeed, if the
number of births and productive-age population do not increase, the problem would remain un-
solved. Nonetheless, Japanʼs experience offers significant pointers for many other nations as
examined in this study, and based on this investigation, more active discussion and research is
now required.
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Figure 1: Changes in Average Values Over the Study Period ⑴
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Figure 2: Changes in Average Values Over the Study Period ⑵
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Figure 3: Changes in Average Values Over the Study Period ⑶
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Figure 4: Breakdown of Land Price Increase Rates, Economic Impacts, and Demographic Impacts
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Figure 5: Relationship between Land Price Increase Rates, Economic Impacts,
and Demographic Impacts (Nationwide)
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Figure 6: Relationship between Land Price Increase Rates, Economic Impacts,
and Demographic Impacts (Tokyo Metropolitan Area)
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Figure 7: Relationship between Land Price Increase Rates, Economic Impacts,
and Demographic Impacts (Nationwide)
Figure 8: Relationship between Land Price Increase Rates, Economic Impacts,
and Demographic Impacts (Tokyo Metropolitan Area)
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Figure 9: Distribution of Population/Old-Age Dependency Ratio (N=1,683)
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Figure 10: Residential Land Price Simulation Results 1 and Proportion of Immigrants in Total Population (N=1,683)
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Figure 11: Residential Land Price Simulation Results 2 (N=1,683)
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Figure 12: Changes in Employment Rate over Time by Gender
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Figure 17: Changes in Average Values over the Study Period ⑸: Multinational Datasets (2010=100)
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Figure 19: Decomposition Results of Historic Price Change in Average
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Figure 20: Decomposition Results of Price Change by Temporal Block ⑴
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Figure 21: Decomposition Results of Price Change by Temporal Block ⑵
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Figure 22: Decomposition Results of Price Change by Temporal Block ⑶
Analysis of policy options to address Japanʼs declining population, shrinking birthrate, and aging society
― 127 ―
Figure 23: Correlation of Historic Residential Price Change, Economic Impact and Demographic Impact
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Figure 24: Changes and Prediction of Old Age Dependency Ratio ⑴
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Figure 25: Changes and Prediction of Old Age Dependency Ratio ⑵
Reitaku International Journal of Economic Studies
― 130 ―
020
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
United States
Canada
Mexico
Chile
Brazil
Colombia
Argentina
South Africa
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
Japan
China
Korea
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
India
Indonesia
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Cyprus
Australia
New Zealand
Figure 26: Changes and Prediction of Total Population ⑴ (2010=100)
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Figure 27: Changes and Prediction of Total Population ⑵ (2010=100)
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Figure 28: Simulation Result of Residential Price Index ⑴ (2010=100)
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Figure 29: Simulation Result of Residential Price Index ⑵ (2010=100)
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